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INTRODUCTION
A formidable tangle of international tax rules currently divides global
jurisdiction to tax. Would formulary apportionment fix it? One proposal
advocates the global allocation of corporate income based mainly on sales.
This Article questions the claim that the unilateral U.S. adoption of such an
approach would produce a simpler system with minimal tax incentives for
the location of production assets or the organization of multinational
corporations (MNCs).
The three factors traditionally used in apportionment of corporate
income, for example by the U.S. states, are sales, payroll and property. Due
to the difficulty of accurately valuing property and the perception that
payroll and property factors would discourage the in-state location of jobs
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and property, many US states heavily weight the sales factor. A destination
sales-based formulary apportionment (DSFA) method would take a similar
approach. One global DSFA path rests on the premise that the unilateral
adoption of such a system would attract productive capacity to the U.S. and
spur other nations to adopt similar systems.
This paper contains three parts. Part I describes the formulary
apportionment concept, in particular the DSFA method. Part II considers
whether unilateral U.S. adoption of a DSFA tax would likely lead to global
DSFA. IVart II argues that although the anticipated incentive to shift
productive assets to the U.S. supports this conclusion, at least two contrary
factors exist. The first factor consists of the origin-based elements of a
DSFA tax, including those arising from business-to-business sales, which
would decrease the productive activity attraction capacity of a DSFA
system. The second is the fact that other nations might not react to the
attraction of productive capacity to the U.S. by adopting DSFA themselves,
because other nations have the alternative options of WTO sanctions, tax
treaty-based objections and corporate income tax repeal.
Part III contributes to the question of whether global DSFA would
indeed be better than the current U.S. corporate tax system. It first notes
that an evaluation of the current system should consider the possibility that
incremental transfer pricing and other reform efforts - which could include
formulary elements - may succeed in limiting the ability of MNCs to shift
income offshore under the current system. It describes the continuing
economic location incentives under global DSFA, which stem from
business-to-business sales and other origin-based incentives under DSFA
allocation and from distortions to cross-border merger decisions. Part III
then discusses the uncertainty of administrative and compliance cost
savings under DSFA and considers the limitations of an international norm
of corporate taxation for the future evolution of the U.S. tax system.
Finally, it identifies the problem of inflexibility as a general problem with
broad, global international tax policy solutions and anticipates further
exploration of the idea that incremental reform is generally a better
approach for.
I. THE POTENTIAL PANACEA
A. Why Consider Formulary Apportionment?
Formulary apportionment divides income among taxing jurisdictions
according to a formula.' Many U.S. states and the Canadian provinces
I See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst,
Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Fornulary Profit Split,
2010]
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currently use formulary apportionment for corporate income, for example.
2
The European Union's uncompleted project to develop an elective Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) also included the proposal to
permit the allocation of the corporate income tax base according to a
formula. 3 Due to the complexities of international tax law, including but not
limited to the transfer pricing rules, policymakers and commentators have
for years considered the possibility of adopting formulary apportionment on
a global basis for business entities. 4 Yet the likely impact of formulary
apportionment remains unclear.
5
9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 498 (2009); Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & Kimberly A. Clausing,
Reforming Corporate Taxation in a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary
Apportionment, in PATH TO PROSPERITY: HAMILTON PROJECT IDEAS ON INCOME SECURITY,
EDUCATION, AND TAXES 319, 327 (Jason Furman & Jason E. Bordoff eds., 2008) (describing
formulary apportionment concept); Paul R. McDaniel, Formulary Taxation in the North
American Free Trade Zone, 49 TAX L. REv. 691, 703 (1994) (describing "formulary taxation
of the unitary enterprise" as "an entirely different form of corporate taxation than currently is
employed by the industrialized countries"); Julie Roin, Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The
Promises and Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment, 61 TAX L. REv.
169, 172-74 (2008) (describing various formulary apportionment projects and systems).
2 See JOANN MARTENS-WEINER, COMPANY TAX REFORM IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 33-
34 (2006) (outlining U.S. and Canadian systems). A variant of a sales-based formulary
apportionment idea also cropped up in a proposal for a "Business Net Receipts Tax" (BNRT)
made by the California Commission on the Twenty-First Century Economy in 2009. The
Commission's proposed BNRT would have imposed a value-added tax on business receipts
and apportioned the tax between California and other states based on single-factor sales. See
CAL. COMM'N ON THE 21ST CENTURY ECON., REPORT, at A-7 (2009) (describing BNRT and
its apportionment); Letter from Joseph Bankman et al. to Commissioner Gerald Parsky
(Sept. 5, 2009) (on file with the author) ("Our concerns regarding the BNRT arise primarily
from the numerous uncertainties relating to administration, compliance, legal challenges, and
economic distortions of such a tax.").
3 See, e.g., Jack Mintz & Joann M. Weiner, Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a
Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union, 62 TAX L. REv. 81, 81
(2008) (outlining the CCCTB project goal).
4 See Michael J. Graetz & Michael M. O'Hear, The "Original Intent" of US.
International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 1089 & n.275 (1997) (noting that the "direct"
apportionment method mediated by the "effectively connected" income rules developed
despite the goal of developing "formulas of general apportionment," which was mentioned
in a 1921 federal statute (citing Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 217(e), 42 Stat. 227, 244-
45 (1921))); Stanley S. Surrey & David R. Tillinghast, General Report, Allocation ofIncome
and Expense Between Related Entities Under Common Control, 56b CAHIERS DE DROIT
FISCAL INTERNATIONALE 1/1, 1/3 (1971) (noting that formulary apportionment would guard
against not only tax-motivated gaming, but also nontax reasons such as exchange controls
for misallocating profit between countries).
5 See, e.g., James R. Hines Jr., Income Misattribution Under Formula Apportionment,
54 EuR. ECON. REv. 108, 110 (2009) (citing uncertainties about redistribution, revenue
effects, administration, and compliance). The uncertainty about the right principle for
[Vol. 29:593
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Under the current U.S. system of international taxation, the U.S. taxes
corporate business entities based on their residence, which is in turn• • 6
determined by their place of incorporation. A U.S. corporation must pay
tax on its worldwide income, subject to a credit for income taxes paid to
non-U.S. governments. 7 However, that worldwide income does not include
the active and non-mobile, or non-subpart F, income of the corporation's
non-U.S. subsidiaries. 8 U.S. income tax is imposed on the non-subpart F
income of such subsidiaries only when it is repatriated to the U.S.
9
These rules encourage MNCs to use transfer pricing to allocate as
much of their income as possible to subsidiaries incorporated in low-tax,
non-U.S. jurisdictions, and to characterize it as non-subpart F income.
10
Corporations expend considerable tax planning energy on this project.
Commentators have documented both the fact that tax considerations help
drive corporations' offshore location decisions and the fact that
dividing corporate income among jurisdictions complicates the exercise of evaluating the
merits of formulary apportionment proposals. See Wolfgang Schrn, International Tax
Coordination for a Second-Best World, 1 WORLD TAX J. 67, 71-84 (2009) (explaining the
limits of the ability-to-pay and benefits principle as well as economic neutrality concepts as
foundational principles for division of taxing jurisdiction).
6 See I.R.C. § 7701(a)(4), (a)(30)(C) (defining a United States person as including a
corporation organized under the laws of any state).
7 See I.R.C. § 11 (imposing an income tax on corporations); I.R.C. § 881 (limiting
income tax base to U.S. source income and income effectively connected with a U.S. trade
or business for non-U.S. corporations); I.R.C. § 901 (providing a direct foreign tax credit for
income taxes paid to non-U.S. governments).
8 See I.R.C. § 951 (providing for current taxation of subpart F income earned by non-
U.S. corporate subsidiaries of U.S. corporations); I.R.C. § 952 (defining subpart F income).
9 U.S. corporations pay tax on dividend income from non-U.S. subsidiaries subject to
the indirect foreign tax credit, which is calculated from the amount of the non-U.S.
subsidiary's non-U.S. income tax and the ratio of the dividend to the earnings of the non-
U.S. subsidiary. See I.R.C. § 902 (providing for indirect foreign tax credit).
10 See, e.g., Stephen E. Shay, Exploring Alternatives to Subpart F, 82 TAXES 29, 31
(Mar. 2004) (noting that transfer pricing and subpart F planning can make deferral
"elective").
I See James R. Hines, Jr., Lessons from Behavioral Responses to International
Taxation, 52 NAT'L TAX J. 305, 312-13 (1999) (summarizing econometric evidence showing
a correlation between lower tax rates and higher foreign direct investment); see, e.g.,
Michael P. Devereux & Rachel Griffith, Taxes and the Location of Production: Evidence
from a Panel of U.S. Multinationals, 68 J. PUB. ECON. 335, 362-63 (1998) (concluding,
based on a conceptual model and large empirical study that when a U.S. firm chooses among
European country locations, an increased effective tax rate decreases the likelihood of
locating in a particular country, and that specifically, a 1% effective tax rate increase
decreases the likelihood of location by about 1.3% in the United Kingdom and 0.5% in
France and Germany); Harry Grubert & John Mutti, Do Taxes Influence Where U.S.
Corporations Invest?, 53 NAT'L TAX J. 825, 825, 835-36 (2000) (concluding that effective
2010]
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jurisdictions compete with each other for MNC business by lowering tax
corporate rates and offering tax holidays or other special incentives. 12A
steady erosion of the corporate tax base has resulted - although the base
has certainly not disappeared altogether. One commentator reports, for
example, that between 1999 and 2004 the average non-U.S. effective tax
rate for most U.S. multinationals declined by more than five percent, from
30.3% to 25.2%, due to roughly equal factors of profit shifting through tax
planning, changed allocation of economic activity, and declining non-U.S.
tax rates. 13 Another recent analysis links higher tax rates to declining
reported corporate profitability and estimates that absent tax rate
differentials $157 billion more in profit would be attributed to U.S. firms
rather than non-U.S. affiliates.1
4
Current transfer pricing rules lack a fundamental connection with the
economic substance of related party transactions and have proven very
difficult to enforce. 15 The arm's length principle of transfer pricing holds
that prices between related parties should be set so as to equal prices that
unrelated parties would agree to.16 The OECD countries, including the
United States, have strongly endorsed the arm's length concept. 17 But, as
tax rates have a "highly significant" effect on non-U.S. investment location decisions for
large U.S. manufacturing MNCs and that an effective tax rate increase of 1% may decrease
invested capital by 3% in open economies).
12 See, e.g., Rosanne Altshuler & Harry Grubert, The Three Parties in the Race to the
Bottom: Host Governments, Home Governments, and Multinational Companies, 7 FLA. TAX
REv. 153, 156 (2005) (reporting the importance of hot countries' efforts to attract U.S.
investment, particularly from 1992-1998). cf Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax
Competition, and the Fiscal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARv. L. REv. 1573, 1581
(2000) (describing the repeal of the withholding tax on U.S. portfolio interest in 1984 as a
"classic 'race to the bottom' as it induced other major economies to repeal their similar
taxes).
13 Martin A. Sullivan, US. Multinationals Paying Less Foreign Tax, 118 TAX NoTEs
1177, 1177-80 (Mar. 17, 2008) (reporting a partial analysis of U.S. multinationals' effective
tax rates as reported on financial statements).
14 Kimberly A. Clausing, Multinational Firm Tax Avoidance and Tax Policy, 57 NAT'L
TAX J. 703, 710-11 (2009) (finding that a 1% higher tax rate leads to a 0.5% reduction in
reported profitability for a corporate affiliate in the taxing jurisdiction).
15 See Ilan Benshalom, Sourcing the "Unsourceable": The Cost Sharing Regulations
and the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions, 26 VA. TAX REv. 631, 641-
45 (2007) (noting the "theoretical deficiency" and "enforcement deficiency" of the arm's
length standard).
16 See, e.g., Treas. Reg. 1.482-1(b)(1) (2009) ("In determining the true taxable income
of a controlled taxpayer, the standard to be applied in every case is that of a taxpayer dealing
at arm's length with an uncontrolled taxpayer.").
17 See, e.g., OECD, TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
AND TAX ADMINISTRATIONS 1-6 (2001) ("[T]he view of OECD Member countries continues
to be that the arm's length principle should govem the evaluation of transfer prices among
[Vol. 29:593
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others have argued, it makes little sense, at least as traditionally applied.
18
Comparables are often scarce because related parties enter into transactions
that unrelated parties would not consider, such as the wholesale license of
intellectual property portfolios. And the theory of the integrated firm
explains that firms integrate management and production functions in order
to realize cost savings, such as from economies of scale, that are not
available in an unrelated party context. 19 At least some of the profit subject
to allocation in the related party situation simply does not exist in any
unrelated "comparable."
B. The Potential of Formulary Apportionment
Proponents argue that formulary apportionment would reduce MNCs'
ability to use transfer pricing to locate their taxable income in low-taxS20
countries. For example, by lowering the price at which a good is sold by a
U.S. parent to a low-tax non-U.S. subsidiary, and increasing the price at
which a good is sold by the low-tax non-U.S. subsidiary to another related
corporation before delivery to a customer, a MNC may increase the profit
allocated to the low-tax subsidiary. Common transfer pricing strategies
include the location of valuable intellectual property in low-tax offshore
corporations, the use of contract manufacturing to characterize low-tax
subsidiaries as earning relatively large amounts of active, non-subpart F
income, and the establishment of commissionaire structures that assign low-
margin responsibility for selling to entities in high-tax countries to.... 21
minimize the income allocated to such jurisdictions.
associated enterprises.").
18 See, e.g., REUVEN S. Av1-YONAH, INTERNATIONAL TAX AS INTERNATIONAL LAW 111
(2007) ("[Il]t became clear by the late 1980s that the traditional methods for addressing
transfer pricing problems were not sufficient because in the vast majority of cases they were
not being applied or were not being applied in a satisfactory way.").
19 See, e.g., Yariv Brauner, Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of
Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes, 28 VA. TAX REV. 79, 87-94 (2008) (noting the
extreme difficulty of valuing intangibles and the incompatibility of arm's length pricing with
the key cost-internalization advantage of a multinational, vertically integrated corporation);
Richard J. Vann, Reflections on Business Profits and the Arm 's Length Principle, in THE
TAXATION OF BUSINESS PROFITS UNDER TAX TREATIES (Brian J. Arnold, Jacques Sasseville
& Eric M. Zolt, eds.) at 133, 140-41 (2006) ("Firms generally, and MNEs in particular, are
created because they generate returns internally above what can be obtained in market
transactions.").
20 See Avi-Yonah, Clausing & Durst, supra note 1, at 507 (noting that formulary
apportionment is intended to minimize income-shifting).
21 See, e.g., Roin, supra note 1, at 230-32 (describing such contract manufacturing and
commissionaire strategies); Shay, supra note 10, at 31-33 (giving an example of "plain-
vanilla" subpart F planning).
2010]
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